We consider the Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a group of noncooperative agents, in a partial-decision information scenario. First, we recast the problem as that of finding a zero of a monotone operator. Then, we design a novel fully distributed, single-layer, fixed-step algorithm, which is a suitably preconditioned proximal-point iteration. We prove its convergence to a Nash equilibrium with geometric rate, by leveraging restricted monotonicity properties, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping. Remarkably, we show that our algorithm outperforms known gradient-based schemes, both in terms of theoretical convergence rate and in practice according to our numerical experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium (NE) problems arise in several network domains, where multiple selfish decision-makers, or agents, aim at optimizing their individual, yet inter-dependent, objective functions. Engineering applications include communication networks [1] , demand-side management in the smart grid [2] , charging/discharging of electric vehicles [3] , demand response in competitive markets [4] . From a game-theoretic perspective, the challenge is to design distributed NE seeking algorithms, using the limited knowledge available to each agent. Typically, the assumption is made that each agent can access the decisions of all the competitors (or a cumulative value in the case of aggregative games), for example in the presence of a coordinator that broadcast the data to the network [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] . However the existence of a central node with bidirectional communication with all the agents is impractical for many applications [9] , [10] .
Therefore, in recent years, there has been an increased attention for fully distributed algorithms, that allow to compute NEs relying on local data only. One solution is offered by pay-off based schemes [11] , [12] , that require the agents to measure their own cost function but not to communicate between each other. Instead, in this paper, we assume that the agents engage in nonstrategic information exchange with their neighbors; based on the data received, they can estimate the strategies of all other agents, and eventually reconstruct the true values. To deal with this partial-information scenario, most of the results available resort to (projected) gradient and consensus dynamics, both in continuous-time [13] - [15] , and discrete-time. For the discrete-time case, early works [16] , M. Bianchi and S. Grammatico [17] , focused on algorithms with vanishing step sizes, that may result in slow convergence. More recently, fixed-step schemes were introduced [18] - [20] , building on a restricted monotonicity property, first revealed in [15] . However, due to the partial-information assumption, usually small step sizes have to be chosen, affecting the speed of convergence. Of particular interest for this paper is the technique used in [20] , [21] , that characterized the equilibria of a (generalized) game as the zeros of a monotone operator. The operatortheoretic approach is very convenient, since several splittings methods are already well established to solve monotone inclusions [22, 26] . For example, the authors of [21] adopted a preconditioned proximal-point algorithm (PPPA). Yet, this results in a double-layer scheme, where the agents have to communicate multiple times to solve (inexactly) a subgame, at each step. Similarly, the proximal best-response dynamic proposed in [23] for stochastic games requires an increasing number of data transmissions per iteration.
Contribution: Motivated by the above, in this paper we further exploit the restricted monotonicity property used in [18] - [20] to solve Nash equilibrium problems under partialdecision information. Specifically:
• We derive a simple, fully-distributed, non gradientbased proximal-point algorithm (PPA), that is a proximal best-response augmented with consensual terms. Thanks to the use of a novel preconditioning matrix, our algorithm is single-layer and single-timescale. We are not aware of other similar schemes in literature. We prove the global, geometric convergence to a NE of our algorithm, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping, by providing a result for the PPA of restricted strongly monotone operators. • We demonstrate, by comparing the theoretical convergence rates and in simulation, that our algorithm outperforms existing gradient-based dynamics, in terms of the number of iterations needed for the convergence.
Basic notation: R denotes the set of real numbers. 0 n (1 n ) denotes the vector of dimension n with all elements equal to 0 (1). I n ∈ R n×n denotes the identity matrix of dimension n. For a matrix A ∈ R n×m , its transpose is A ⊤ , [A] i,j represents the element on the row i and column j. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product of the matrices A and B. For x, y ∈ R n , let x ⊤ y and x denote the Euclidean inner product and norm respectively. A denotes the largest singular value of A. A ≻ 0 stands for symmetric positive definite matrix. Given A ≻ 0, x | y A = x ⊤ Ay denotes the A-induced inner product of the vectors x and y, x A = √
x ⊤ Ax denotes the the A-induced norm of the vector x. If A is symmetric, λ min (A) = λ 1 (A) ≤ · · · ≤ λ n (A) =: λ max (A) denote its eigenvalues. Given N vectors x 1 , . . . , x N , possibly of different dimensions, x := col (x 1 , . . . , x N ) = [x ⊤ 1 . . . x ⊤ N ] ⊤ , and for each i = 1, . . . , N , x −i := col (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x N ). Given the sets {S i } i∈I , I = {1, . . . , N } we define S := i∈I S i := S 1 ×· · ·×S N . diag(A 1 , . . . , A N ) denotes the block diagonal matrix with A 1 , . . . , A N on its diagonal. For a differentiable function g : R n → R, ∇ x g(x) denotes its gradient.
Operator-theoretic definitions: The mapping ι S : R n → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the set S ⊆ R n , i.e., ι S (x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. For a function ψ : R n → R, dom(ψ) := {x ∈ R n | ψ(x) < ∞}; ∂ψ : dom(ψ) ⇒ R n denotes its subdifferential set-valued mapping, defined as ∂ψ(
The set-valued mapping N S : R n ⇒ R n denotes the normal cone operator for the the set S ⊆ R n , i.e.,
denote the set of fixed points and of zeros, respectively. F −1 denotes the inverse mapping of F , defined through its graph as gph(
II. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
We consider a set of noncooperative agents, I := {1, . . . , N }, where each agent i ∈ I shall choose its decision variable (i.e., strategy) x i from its local decision set Ω i ⊆ R ni . Let x = col((x i ) i∈I ) ∈ Ω denote the stacked vector of all the agents' decisions, Ω = i∈I Ω i ⊆ R n the overall action space and n := N i=1 n i . Moreover, let x −i = col((x j ) j∈I\{i} ) denote the collective strategy of the all the agents, except that of agent i. The goal of each agent i ∈ I is to minimize its objective function J i (x i , x −i ) which depends on both the local variable x i and on the decision variables of the other agents x −i . The game is represented by the inter-dependent optimization problems:
Our goal is to compute a NE, as defined next.
Definition 1:
A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies
In the following, we postulate standard convexity and regularity assumptions for the feasible sets and cost functions.
Standing Assumption 1 (Regularity and convexity):
For each i ∈ I, the set Ω i is non-empty, closed and convex; J i is continuously differentiable and the function J i (·, x −i ) is convex for every x −i .
Under Standing Assumption 1, a collective strategy x * is a NE of the game in (1) if and only if it is a solution of the variational inequality 1 VI(F, Ω) [24, Prop. 1.4.2], where F is the pseudo-gradient mapping of the game:
Equivalently, x * is a NE if and only if the following holds:
A sufficient condition for the existence of a unique NE for the game in (1) 
Standing Assumption 2:
The pseudo-gradient mapping in (2) is strongly monotone and Lipschitz continuous: for any
III. DISTRIBUTED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING
In this section, we present an algorithm to seek a NE of the game (1) For ease of notation, we will also assume that every node of the graph has a self-loop and that W is doubly stochastic.
Standing Assumption 4: The mixing matrix W satisfies the following conditions:
Such a mixing matrix can be generated on any connected undirected graph [25, Section 2.4] . We call L := I N − W the normalized Laplacian matrix.
To cope with partial-decision information, we impose that each agent keeps an estimate of all other agents' action. We denote x i = col((x i,j ) j∈I ) ∈ R N n , where x i,i := x i and x i,j is i's estimate of agent j's action, for all j = i. In steady state, agents should agree on their estimates, i.e., x i = x j for all i, j ∈ I. Our proposed algorithm is summarized in the table below, where α > 0 is a global constant parameter, and the initial conditions x 0 i ∈ R ni , x 0 i,−i ∈ R n−ni can be chosen arbitrarily, for all i ∈ I.
At each step k, Algorithm 1 works as follows: 1. Communication: Each agent i exchanges its estimates x k i with its neighbors only. 2. Estimates update: Each agent i chooses the updated estimate of the decision of all the other agents x k+1 i,−i as a convex combination of its previous estimate x k i,−i and the aggregate estimates of the quantity x −i among its neighbors, i.e. j∈Ni w ij x k j,−i . Globally, the procedure resembles a consensus algorithm. If we consider all the quantities x j,i , j = i, the update can be interpreted as the attempt of all the agents j to reach agreement on the time-varying quantity x i , on a graph. 3. Strategy update: The agents update their own strategies based on a proximal best-response. Each agent i chooses the action that minimizes its cost plus quadratic terms, penalizing the distance (weighted by α) from: 1) its previous strategy x k i , and 2) the aggregate estimates of the local decision x i among its neighbors, i.e., j∈Ni w ij x k j,i . We remark that the agents evaluate their cost functions in their local estimates, not on the actual collective strategy.
Remark 1:
The functions J i (·, x i,−i ) are strongly convex, for all x i,−i , for all i ∈ I, as a consequence of Standing Assumption 2. Therefore the argmin operator in Algorithm 1 is single-valued.
IV. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we first recast Algorithm 1 as a PPPA. Then we prove its convergence, by leveraging a restricted monotonicity property, under which classical results for the PPA of monotone operators still hold.
A. Derivation of the algorithm
For ease of notation, let us define, as in [20, , for all i ∈ I,
where n <i := j<i,j∈I n j , n >i := j>i,j∈I n j . We note that R i selects the i-th n i dimensional component from an n-dimensional vector, while S i removes it. Thus,
. It follows that x = Rx and col((x i,−i ) i∈I ) = Sx ∈ R (N −1)n . Moreover, we have that
We define the extended pseudo-gradient mapping F as
and the mappings
where α > 0 is a fixed parameter, and
The following lemma relates the NE of the game in (1) to the operators F a and A. The proof is analogous to [19, Prop. 1] , and hence it is omitted.
Lemma 1: The following statements are equivalent:
We emphasize that Lemma 1 provides a systematic way of deriving fully-distributed NE seeking algorithms, by applying standard solution methods to the VI(F a , Ω) (e.g., in [19] , a projected gradient-method was developed) or operator splitting methods to compute a zero of the operator A(x) (e.g., [20] follows a similar approach for games with coupling constraints). Nonetheless, technical difficulties arise because of the partial-information assumption. Specifically, the operators A and F a are not monotone in general, not even if strong monotonicity of the pseudo-gradient mapping F holds, i.e., Standing Assumption 2. Only when the estimates x belong to the consensus subspace, i.e. x = 1 N ⊗ x, we have that F (x) = F (x).
In fact, Algorithm 1 is an instance of PPA [22, Th. 23 .41] to seek a zero of A. We remark that many operator-theoretic properties are not guaranteed for the resolvent of a nonmonotone operator B : S ⇒ R m , S ⊆ R m . For example, J B = (Id + B) −1 may have a limited domain, or be not single-valued. In this general case we write the PPA as
that is well defined only if J B (ω k ) = ∅. Next, we show that Algorithm 1 is obtained by applying the iteration in (11) to the operator Φ −1 A, where
is a symmetric, positive definite matrix, known as preconditioning matrix. We note that Φ ≻ 0 under Standing Assumption 4, by Gershgorin circle theorem, and that zer(A) = zer(Φ −1 A).
Lemma 2: Algorithm 1 is equivalent to
with A as in (8), Φ as in (12) . Proof: By definition of inverse operator we have that
In turn, the last inclusion can be split in two components by left-multiplying both sides with R and S. Therefore, by noticing that SN Ω = 0 (N −1)n and SR ⊤ = 0 (N −1)n×n , (13) is equivalent to
The conclusion follows since the zeros of the subdifferential of a (strongly) convex function coincide with the minima (unique minimum) [22, Th. 16.3] . Remark 2: The preconditioning matrix Φ is designed to decouple the system of inclusion in (13) from the graph structure, i.e., to remove the term W x k+1 (in this way, x k+1 i does not depend on x k+1 j , for i = j). This ensures that the resulting updates can be computed by the agents in a fullydistributed fashion.
Remark 3: From Lemma 2 and the explicit form of the resolvent J Φ −1 A in Algorithm 1, we conclude that dom(J Φ −1 A ) = R N n and that J Φ −1 A is single-valued on the whole domain.
B. Convergence analysis
Since the operator Φ −1 A is not maximally monotone in general, the convergence of Algorithm 1 cannot be inferred by standard results for the PPA. In [19, Th. 5] , the authors proposed an accelerated gradient NE seeking scheme, which provides geometric convergence if the mapping F a is strongly monotone. However, this is a limiting assumption, that can be guaranteed only for some classes of games (cf. [19, Rem. 3] ). Instead, our analysis is based on a weaker condition, namely the restricted strong monotonicity of F a only with respect to the NE. This property has already been exploited in the context of games under partial-decision information [20] , [18] . The main advantage is that, for suitable choices of the parameter α, restricted strong monotonicity (unlike strong monotonicity) of F a holds for any game satisfying Standing Assumptions 1-4, as formalized in the next two statements.
Lemma 3: The extended pseudo-gradient mapping F in (6) is Lipschitz continuous: for any pair x, y ∈ R N n ,
Proof: See Appendix VII-A. 
For any α < α max , for any x and any x ′ ∈ E n := {y ∈ R N n : y = 1 N ⊗ n, y ∈ R n }, it holds that M ≻ 0 and also that
Moreover, the operator Φ −1 A retains this property, in the space induced by the inner product · | · Φ .
Lemma 5: Let α max and ρ be as in (14) and assume that 0 < α < α max is chosen. Then Φ −1 A is ρ Φ -restricted strongly monotone, with respect to zer(A), in the Φ-induced norm: for all x ∈ R N n and all y ∈ zer(A), it holds that
Towards our main result, we next prove the convergence of the sequence generated by (11) to an equilibrium, under restricted strong monotonicity of the operator B. The proof is based on the restricted contractivity of J B with respect to its fixed points.
Theorem 1: Let B : S ⇒ R m , with S ⊆ R m , be restricted strongly monotone with respect to zer(B), in the space defined by some inner product · | · Ψ , i.e. :
Proof: See Appendix VII-C. We are now ready to show the main result of this section, namely the geometric convergence to a NE of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 2: Let α max , ρ be as in (14), Φ as in (12) , and let 0 < α < α max . For any initial condition, the sequence (x k ) k∈N generated by Algorithm 1 converges to the point x * = 1 n ⊗ x * , where x * is the unique NE of the game in (1), with geometric rate, i.e., for all k ∈ N,
Proof: See Appendix VII-D. Remark 4: If the mixing matrix W is not doubly stochastic (i.e., if the last condition in Standing Assumption 4 does not hold), an iteration analogous to Algorithm 1 can be derived by defining L = D −W , A(x) = αR ⊤ F (x)+(D− W )x+N Ω (x) and Φ = D +W , where D = D ⊗I n and D is the degree matrix of the graph, for which the convergence result in Theorem 2 still holds.
V. DISCUSSION ON THE CONVERGENCE RATE
In this section we compare the convergence rates of Algorithm 1 with respect to two gradient-based NE seeking schemes recently presented in [26] .
The first algorithm is the GRANE [26, Alg. 1], that converges geometrically (in squared norm) under restricted strongly monotonicity of F a , with rate
where θ F a is the Lipschitz constant of F a , ρ as in (14) . The second algorithm is the acc-GRANE [26, Alg. 2] whose (geometric) convergence is guaranteed under the more restrictive assumption of µ F a -strong monotonicity of the mapping F a with respect to the whole space, with rate
The convergence rate of Algorithm 1, in squared norm, is
We note that
where we used that Φ = 2 due to Standing Assumption 4. From the expression of α max in (14) , and by picking α < α max to ensure restricted strong monotonicity, we deduce that αF is λ2(L) 2 -Lipschitz continuous, where λ 2 (L) ≤ 2. Moreover, λ max (L) ≥ 1, when the self-loop weights are chosen small enough (as the sum of the N − 1 positive eigenvalues of L is N − i∈I w ii ). It can be proven, using Kronecker product properties, that 3 ≥ λ max (L)
We conclude that, when the condition number γ := θF a ρ is large (which is typically the case, since ρ is usually small), Algorithm 1 has a faster (theoretical) convergence rate than the GRANE, by (17b). Moreover, if θ F a > 1, then the upper bound on the rate of Algorithm 1 is better than that of acc-GRANE, by (17a).
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
We consider games as in [19] , for scalar agents i ∈ I = {1, . . . , 20}, with cost function
and we impose c ij = −c ji . The communication graph is generated randomly.
Unconstrained action sets: We choose a i = 1 ∀ ∈ I, we randomly generate the parameters b i and c ij . We set α ≃ 0.026 to maximize the minimum eigenvalue of M in Comparison of PPPA, gradient play and GRANE, with the theoretical step sizes that ensure convergence. (14) . We compare Algorithm 1 with the GRANE [26, Alg. 1] and the gradient play [27, Eq. 7] . For both algorithms we choose the best step sizes that ensure convergence. Namely, for the GRANE, we compute λ ≃ 6.4 × 10 −4 , as in [26, Th. 9] , for the gradient play we fix the maximum α [27] Figure 1 shows the results for the three algorithms. Because of the small step sizes, both gradient algorithms are converging very slowly to the unique NE and are overperformed by far by our PPPA. Our numerical experience suggests that the theoretical bounds for the parameters that ensure convergence are very conservative. In Figure 2 , we repeat the experiment by taking α, λ and α [27] 100 times bigger than the theoretical upper bounds. The convergence appears faster for all the algorithms, but Algorithm 1 is still orders of magnitude better than the gradient-based schemes.
Constrained action sets: We consider the action of each player to be constrained in the box set [−1, 1]. We compare Algorithm 1 with the acc-GRANE in [19, Alg. 2] , that is guaranteed to converge under strong monotonicity of the mapping F a in (7) (therefore, a stronger condition than the restricted monotonicity we used). We set a i = 6, α = 1. The operator F a is strongly monotone with parameter µ F a ≃ 0.018, despite F being 6-strongly monotone. We also simulate the GRANE [19, Alg. 1] and the Inexact-ADMM algorithm [18, Alg. 1] (with c 0 = α = 1 as in [18, Th. 1] ). The results are illustrated in Figure 3 .
VII. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Nash equilibrium problems in partial-decision information scenarios can be solved via a fully distributed preconditioned proximal-point algorithm, under strong monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of the game mapping. Our algorithm has proven much faster than the existing gradient-based methods, at least in our numerical experience. The extension of our results to games with coupling constraints or played on timevarying communication networks is left as future research. 
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 3
Let us define x = col((x i ) i∈I ), y = col((y i ) i∈I ). By Standing Assumption 2, we have, for all i ∈ I,
as it follows by choosing x j = y j for all j = i. Therefore it holds that
Then θ ≥ µ follows by choosing Sx = Sy, x = y.
B. Proof of Lemma 5
The operator A in (8) is ρ-restricted strongly monotone with respect to the consensus subspace E n , by Lemma 4 and monotonicity of the normal cone. Also zer(A) ∈ E n by Lemma 1, and we can write A(x) − A(y) | x − y ≥ ρ x − y 2 . Hence
C. Proof of Theorem 1
We remark that fix(J B ) = zer(B), since, for anyȳ ∈ R m , 0 m ∈ B(ȳ) ⇐⇒ȳ ∈ȳ + B(ȳ) ⇐⇒ (Id + B) −1 (ȳ) ∋ȳ.
Since u ∈ J B (x) and v ∈ J B (z), by definition of the resolvent J B , it follows that z − v ∈ B(v), x − u ∈ B(u). Therefore, the restricted strong monotonicity property in (15) reads as
Moreover, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have that
For x = z, the previous inequality implies u = v, hence J B is single valued on fix(J B ) = zer(B), i.e., v = z. In turn, by dividing both sides of (19) by u − v Ψ , for the iteration in (11) , twe obtain that
By recursion, we conclude convergence of the sequence (ω k ) k∈N to z accoording to (16) . Since z is any point in zer(B), it also follows that zer(B) must be a singleton.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 2 states that Algorithm 1 is an instance of the PPA, applied to the operator A in (8) . By Lemma 1, x * is the unique zero of A. The resolvent J Φ −1 A is full domain by Remark 3. Therefore, by Theorem 1 and Lemma 5 it follows that
